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To Bernard M. Baruch
April 29, 1940 [Washington, D.C.]
My dear Mr. Baruch:
Your letter of April 22d was forwarded to me at Fort Benning, where I was making a hasty visit during the maneuvers.
I am glad you think that the going will be good before the Senate towards an increase in our appropriations, and am well aware of the responsibility I carry in the matter. Confidentially, at the same time as I received your letter, a radio came from the War Department to the effect that the Budget (meaning the President) had just cut six and one-half million from the thirty-nine million materiel estimate that I had submitted as being urgently required at the present time over and above the materiel included in the 1941 budget.
I reached the office this morning and immediately took up matters with the Bureau of the Budget people at their office, but learned that the President had already signed the communication transmitting the deficiency estimates to the Congress, so I will have to maneuver this somehow in spite of legal restrictions in the matter.
The money I am referring to was that required for the materiel, and particularly the Aircraft warning detectors,1 for the Initial Protective Force—the existing units of the Regular establishment and the National Guard, and it did not take into consideration at all the two hundred and forty million deficiency in materiel of modern type for the whole Protective Mobilization Plan force.
I will let you know what happens; I am appearing tomorrow morning before the Senate Appropriations Committee.
With my thanks again for your tremendous assistance in this matter,
Document Copy Text Source: George C. Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, Selected Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia.
Document Format: Typed letter.
1. On November 29, 1939, Marshall, Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, and Major General Henry H. Arnold had gone to the Signal Corps center at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to witness an important test of the army’s “radio position finding” system. The army officially adopted the device, designated SCR-270, in May 1940, and it remained a standard unit for several years. (Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Emergency, a volume in the United States Army in World War II [Washington: GPO, 1956], pp. 41, 128-29.) The United States Navy acronym RADAR (from “radio detection and ranging”) had not yet come into general use for these electronic devices.
Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland, Sharon Ritenour Stevens, and Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr. (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981- ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 2, “We Cannot Delay,” July 1, 1939-December 6, 1941 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 204-205.